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Corruption and Reform in Higher Education in Ukraine
Ararat L. Osipian (Vanderbilt University)
Abstract
At least thirty percent of Ukrainians enter colleges by paying bribes while many others use their
connections with the faculty and administration. Corruption increases inequalities in access to higher
education, prevents future economic growth in the country, and undermines quality and credentials
of academic degrees. This paper considers corruption in higher education in Ukraine, including such
aspects as corruption in admissions to higher education institutions and corruption in administering
the newly introduced standardized test. The reform of higher education in Ukraine, based on the
national examinations, is intended to be a response to the rapidly changing economic environment
and the new social order.
Résumé
Au moins un tiers des étudiants ukrainiens des collèges universitaires a été admis en payant des potsde-vins, le reste s’est servi de ses contacts avec les départements académiques et administratifs. La
corruption accentue un accès inégal aux universités, freine la croissance économique future du pays
et remet en question la qualité et les cartes de présentation des diplômes académiques. Cet article
vise la corruption dans les universités ukrainiennes et plus précisément, la corruption lors des
processus d’admission dans les institutions d’éducation supérieure ainsi que dans l’administration du
nouvel examen standard utilisé à cet effet. La réforme de l’éducation supérieure en Ukraine, basée
sur l’application d’examens nationaux, cherche à répondre à un nouvel ordre économique et surtout
à un environnement économique en constante mutation.

INTRODUCTION
The process of globalization leads to increasing international trade in higher
education. Along with processes of labor migration it makes educational
credentials extend from the realm of national educational systems into
international relations. Skills and qualifications are notarized in educational
certificates. But what if certificates are fake, qualifications are overestimated or
institutions exist only on paper? This raises the issue of corruption in higher
education.
Ukraine has a strong tradition of educating students from abroad, mostly
from the developing nations. The system of selecting and educating students
from overseas was developed in Soviet times. Universities are active in the
international arena to offer their educational services and generate revenues.
According to Kerr, “For the first time, a really international world of learning,
highly competitive, is emerging. If you want to get into that orbit, you have to do
soon merit.” (Kerr, 1993, p. 33) Corruption, rampant in Ukrainian higher
education institutions (HEIs), undermines the quality of education and its status
in the educational services market.
Internationalization in education touches on the issue of immigration and
the international labor market. The immigration flow from Ukraine is mostly
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directed to the Russian Federation, European Union, the US, and Canada
(Ministerstvo, 2008). Educational credentials of Ukrainians in other countries are
not well received. First, the language is a natural barrier, but more importantly,
solid modern knowledge is often lacking. The Bologna Declaration and Lisbon
Convention adopted by Ukraine are intended to integrate the nation’s education
sector into the larger European community. However, if the situation with
corruption does not change drastically, international credential recognition will
not be possible. This problem is common for the former Soviet republics.
Heyneman, Anderson, and Nuraliyeva (2008) point out that “Whether
experienced or perceived, universities or university systems with reputations for
corruption will likely end the Bologna process. Were this process to actually take
effect it would constitute the educational equivalent in the EU of unilateral
disarmament.” (p. 1) Countries with a high level of credibility and low level of
corruption are unlikely to recognize educational credentials from the countries
where degrees are bought and sold. This may lead to the collapse of the initiative
of creating a common educational space within the larger Europe.
This paper addresses the issue of corruption in higher education in
Ukraine as well as the reform that aims at modernizing the higher education
sector and curbing corruption. It uses official reports and documents, reports and
comments in mass media, and results of surveys as an informative base for the
research.
CORRUPTION IN ACADEMIA: DEFINITIONS AND FORMS
Corruption in higher education is by no account a new phenomenon. It was
commonplace in medieval universities, including in Bologna and the Sorbonne
(Osipian, 2004a, 2004b). The word corruption comes from the Latin word
corruptio, which in Medieval Latin expressed a moral decay, wicked behavior,
putridity, rottenness (Johnston, 1996, p. 322). Milovanovic says that in this
context one could talk of bribes, or other dishonest means for achieving
particular disgraceful ends, as a symptom of an ailing society (Milovanovic,
2001).
Osborne sees corruption as “a loss of purity and purpose, a social
decomposition.” (Osborne, 1997) For Anechiarico and Jacobs, the definition of
education corruption includes the abuse of authority for material gain
(Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1995). Heyneman adds to this definition by arguing the
following: “But because education is an important public good, its professional
standards include more than just material goods; hence the definition of
education corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well as
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material gain.” (Heyneman, 2004, p. 638) Miller, Roberts, and Spence (2005)
point to the relativeness of the term corruption as applied to academia.
Ukrainian authors refer to the International Institute for Educational
Planning’s definition of corruption in education as a “misuse of public office for
private gain that influences access, quality, and equity in education.” (Bazhal et
al., 2006) Sayed and Bruce (1998) and Waite and Allen (2003) present a broad
social approach to define corruption. This paper adheres to Petrov and Temple’s
(2004) approach to corruption and applies a narrow definition of corruption that
regards corruption as such only if it implies illegality. It uses the operational
definition of corruption in higher education as a system of informal relations
established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets
through abuse of the office of public or corporate trust (Osipian, 2007a, p. 314).
Hallak and Poisson (2007) present a wide range of misconduct that may be found
in academia throughout the world (Osipian, 2008e). Corruption may be found not
only in colleges, but in doctoral education as well (Osipian, 2010, 2009f).
Several forms of corruption may be found in higher education in Ukraine
and other former Soviet republics. Forms of corruption include bribery,
embezzlement, extortion, fraud, ghost instructors, abuse of public property,
nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, cheating, plagiarism, and research
misconduct. They rarely appear on their own. Forms of corruption are often
connected in bundles. For instance, assigning a high grade to a student in
exchange for a bribe implies fraud. A form itself can have different origins. A
bribe can be offered voluntarily or extorted. It can be in the form of cash,
merchandize, service, or a monetary donation. Silova, and Bray (2006) describe
the black market of private tutoring in former Socialist countries. In addition to
classical forms of corruption, gross waste in educational management and sexual
misconduct take place in higher education institutions in Ukraine as well as many
other countries.
HIGHER EDUCATION CORRUPTION INTERNATIONALLY
Hallak and Poisson (2007) attempt to present academic corruption in its entirety
all over the world, while grounding their work in the evidence derived from
secondary sources. The authors use a managerial approach to corruption, helpful
for administrators of educational institutions. Hallak and Poisson (2007) present
the first systematic overview of forms of academic corruption throughout the
world, which makes their study unique. In addition, there are numerous media
accounts of higher education corruption that describe its prevalence, patterns, and
forms in many countries. However, systematic rigorous research on the issue is
virtually nonexistent. Shaw (2005) and Heyneman, Anderson, and Nuraliyeva
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(2008) present a quantitative analysis of corruption in higher education in
Ukraine, and in Central Asia, respectively. Osipian (2007e, 2008d) presents a
systematized content analysis of media reports on corruption in higher education
in the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation, placing them in the context of
reforms and major changes in the industry. International perspectives on
corruption in higher education are also presented in Osipian (2007h).
Theorizing higher education corruption, including state—university
relations, concepts of corruption, and methodological approaches to its
comparisons and measurements may be found in Osipian (2008a, 2008c, 2007i).
Heyneman (2004) offers quite an exhaustive list of functions of higher education
institutions and the way in which they become corrupted. Both authors built their
theories while focusing primarily on the countries of the former Soviet Bloc.
Theorizing corruption in academia extends into modeling and developing
possible hierarchical structures of corruption that exist in universities. Osipian
(2008b) offers advanced quantitative techniques for modeling misconduct in
large educational organizations. Corruption hierarchies in education in
developing and transition societies are modeled and analyzed by Waite and Allen
(2003), Petrov and Temple’s (2004), and Osipian (2006, 2007c, 2009d, 2009h).
The authors study corruption in higher education, including from an
organizational perspective, by pointing out differences between bribery and
extortion, channeling illicit benefits through the layers of hierarchical structures,
and vertical and horizontal axes of informal authority and power that exist in
corrupt colleges and universities.
Higher education corruption may be found in many national systems
from Central Asia (Osipian, 2009a) to the US (Osipian, 2009c, 2009e). Regionwise, scholarly work on academic corruption is focused disproportionately on the
countries of the former Soviet Bloc. This may be explained by at least tree facts.
First, the higher education sector in the former socialist countries was large and
highly developed. Because of its size and significance, it attracts attention.
Second, rapid socio-economic and political changes led to a dramatic increase in
corruption, including in higher education. Finally, the former Soviet republics
undertake unprecedented education reforms, including introduction of
standardized national testing and privatization (Osipian, 2009b). The size of the
system and the scale of the problem urge scholars to investigate both forms of
illicit activities and causes of such activities. Accordingly, Russia, Ukraine, and
Central Asia are attracting much attention of the media and, lately, of scholars as
well.
Satarov (2006) offers a survey based analysis of corruption process in
Russia, focusing on such issues as the level of corruption, corruption markets,
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structure of the problem, and major trends. He points out to an increase in
corruption in the education sector, including higher education, since 2001.
Statarov (2006) confirms that higher education is one of the most corrupt sectors
of the Russian economy, if not the most corrupt one. The reform of Russian
higher education and measures against corruption, including the introduction of
standardized testing, are presented in Osipian (2007d, 2007g). One of the reasons
why the Russian leadership agreed to replace university entry examinations with
standardized tests was with the intent to reduce the level of corruption in
academia. Petrov and Temple (2004) study corruption in Russian universities and
compare it to corruption that takes place in universities in Azerbaijan. They come
to the conclusion that while in Russia bribery from faculty members is rather
need-based, i.e. explained by their low salaries, in Azerbaijan it is more of a
direct extortion, when college faculty collect informal payments from just about
every student.
Tarling (2005) offers some theoretical explanations regarding corruption
and good governance in Asian countries. Silova, Johnson, and Heyneman (2007)
present a comprehensive overview and analysis of education corruption and the
crisis of social cohesion in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Silova (2005) also offers
an analysis of problems, faced by the education sector in Central Asia. The
explanatory concept “Feed from the service” is offered in Osipian (2007f). It
describes the model of corruption and coercion in the state—university relations
based on the mosaics of facts about academic corruption that takes place in the
region. Heyneman (2007) presents an interview based research conducted in
three universities in Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The author shows
different aspects of the ongoing struggle against corruption and for social
cohesion that takes place in these former Soviet republics.
Sanghera and Romanchuk (2002) describe bribery and other forms of
corruption in Kyrgyz state universities. They underline the far reaching possible
consequences of corruption in education, including ethical implications, erosion
of professionalism and academic values, and the negative impact on the national
economy. Along with Sanghera and Romanchuk (2002), Reeves (2004) points
out that “the result is not only the production of underqualified specialists whose
real knowledge corresponds only remotely with the list of courses detailed on
their diplomas. Another effect is a much more profound societal skepticism
regarding assertions of educational expertise.” A real battle for the restoration of
academic integrity and reform in Georgian higher education is reflected in works
of Heyneman (2007), Janashia (2004), and Temple (2006).
Former Soviet republics, including Russia and those in the Central Asian
region are certainly not alone in the list of notoriously corrupted national
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educational systems. According to some initial studies and comments, Chinese
higher education sector suffers of rampant corruption as well. It penetrates
different areas of this industry and corrupts its functions. Yang (2005) points out
that “Individual violations are closely related to the way the system operates.
While economic and political corruption attracts widespread attention, academics
avoid scrutiny due to the special nature of their profession but have also
abandoned the traditional values of the university.” He reports corruption in
academic research, administration, promotions, doctoral education, and other
spheres, calling China’s academe a “plagiarist’s paradise.” Rampant corruption
undermines academic standards and worth of the degrees and credentials: “Cash,
power, and influence become corrupting factors and compromise academic
standards.” Illicit dealings between universities, businessmen and government
officials add to corruptness of academia. Yang (2005) concludes that corruption
greatly hinders the internationalization of China’s higher education and is
detrimental to scholarly exchanges.
Literature on academic corruption in Ukraine includes quantitative
analyses of bribery and other patterns of illicit behavior, conducted by Shaw
(2005), a study of corruption and politicization of universities that can be
observed during the Orange Revolution (Osipian, 2005), as well as an analysis of
higher education corruption in Ukraine as reflected in the national media
(Osipian, 2007b, 2007j). This includes opinions and estimates of current situation
and future perspectives, presented by the leading Ukrainian educators. Stetar,
Panych, and Cheng (2005) confirm that “the role of bribery in Ukrainian higher
education has become corrosive, and a small number of education leaders from
both the private and state sectors are beginning to challenge the system.”
FACTS ABOUT CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE’S HIGHER EDUCATION
SECTOR
Law enforcement agencies attempt to confine corruption within the certain
reasonable limits by deterring faculty members from unreasonably risky or highscale corrupt activities. For instance, the Chief of the Center of Public Relations
of the Ministry of the Interior in Ternopilska oblast, Sergij Shvornikov, reports
that a forty year-old Associate Professor in one of the region’s HEIs was detained
for demanding bribes from the students. The detained professor allegedly
distributed the students a price list prior to the spring examination session: “In
order to receive C or ‘satisfactory’ one would have to pay 50 UAH, B or ‘good’ –
100 UAH, and A or ‘excellent’ was priced at 150 UAH.” (Unian, 2007) The
exchange rate is currently around 5UAH for $1. Accordingly, C costs $10, B
costs $20, and A costs $30. For comparison, the average monthly wage in
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Ukraine in 2007 was equal to $250. The professor was caught red-handed and
arrested while accepting a bribe of 650UAH, or $130 (Osvita, 2007). The
national news agency UNIAN commented on the case in a piece entitled “The
season of bribes in HEIs has begun,” pointing to the fact that corruption in HEIs
experiences resurgence twice a year, when the examination period starts (Unian,
2007).
A departmental chair in Lugansk demanded that students pay his bills
from electronics and construction stores and he accepted cash as well. The
corrupt chair was arrested while receiving a bribe of 10000UAH or $2000. In yet
another case, the deputy-director of the Kiev National University’s college was
arrested while receiving a bribe of $5000 plus 5000UAH. There were 210 cases
of bribery registered in higher education institutions in the first six months of
2006, of which 11 were in Kiev (Grishina and Korchinsky, 2006).
The number of cases of bribery in higher education, reported by the
Ministry of the Interior, appears to be but the tip of the iceberg for the industry,
plagued with corruption. According to the survey conducted by the Millennium
Challenge Corporation with the support of the Ukrainian government, corruption
riddled all the spheres of the economy and society, not limiting itself to the
public sector. The respondents consider higher education institutions as the most
corrupted organizations, followed by hospitals and polyclinics, law enforcement
agencies, and tax collection offices. Fifty-two percent of the citizens consider
corruption as the easiest and most reliable way of solving many problems.
Moreover, this view is more characteristic of the younger generation that
constitutes the student body and will eventually define the nation’s future.
The scale and scope of corruption in Ukraine’s education industry is
impressive, indeed. It might be no different from many other countries, and is
likely less than in most of the other former Soviet republics, but the rate of
growth of the criminal activities in education is alarming. At the same time the
number of accused is incredibly small, because students, their parents, and
colleagues of corrupt faculty members tend not to report cases of corruption.
Moreover, an act of corruption is considered as a mutually beneficial agreement.
Students often welcome an opportunity to improve their grades by paying bribes
while parents offer bribes to secure admission of their children to a HEI. Bribery
is very difficult to prove when both sides are satisfied with the results of a
corrupt transaction. While complaining about the high level of corruption in
general, students are rarely willing to turn in corrupt professors, even in cases of
direct extortion.
Students contribute to corruption by choosing an easy but illegal way of
receiving good grades. Many students either create situations for corruption or
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would not miss a chance of improving their grades in exchange for bribes, if such
an offer came from their professor. The survey shows that the share of such
students equals 21 percent in Donetskaya oblast, 29 percent in Kiev, 28 percent
in Lviv, 25 percent in Odessa, and 30 percent in Kharkov. Another 15 percent of
the respondents said that they would not take advantage of such offer but would
inform their friends of the existing opportunity. Only 21 to 26 percent of all
students, depending on the region, would refuse to do this. Finally, only 3 to 8
percent would inform the police. At the same time 42 percent of the parents of
the prospective students said that instead of wasting time on preparation of their
children for college entry examinations they would rather seek other ways and
means, including informal payments and connections (Bazhal et al., 2007). Gifts
are considered a norm in HEIs (Km.ru, 2007).
Private tutoring is thought to be a form of corruption in admissions as
well. A payment of $2000 to $4000 to a private tutor who is also a professor at a
leading university may help in gaining admission to the program where he
teaches (Grishina and Korchinskij, 2006). A conflict of interest arises when an
applicant takes his oral entry examination with the professor who tutored him
before, specifically for this examination. However, private tutoring is legal.
Many college professors offer formally registered consulting services and pay
taxes from their income. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether the payment
for tutoring services, even if unreasonably high, is actually a bribe. Private tutors
who are also members of the admission committee are especially popular among
the applicants.
Corruption in higher education is not limited to academic corruption.
Embezzlement, fraud, gross waste, misallocation of resources, and other corrupt
activities are found throughout the country. One of the latest investigations
reports that the former president of the Lugansk branch of the Inter-Regional
Academy of Personnel Management [Mizhregionalna Akademiya Upravlinnya
Personalom (MAUP)] embezzled 831.9 thousand UAH (CityNews, 2006). The
relations between MAUP, one of the largest private for-profit providers of
educational services in the country, and the Ministry of Education and Science
are quite tense, with challenges and mutual accusations being voiced in the
media. The website of this educational institution offers, among other services, a
US-format Ph.D. in Psychology through another higher education institution,
based in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Hawaii-based “university” is a notorious
diploma mill, evicted from the state by the court decision.
Diploma mills and low quality educational programs, previously
unknown in Ukraine, can now be found in form of branches of public and private
higher education institutions. The State Attestation Commission [Derzhavna
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Atestatsijna Komissiya (DAK)] that conducts accreditation withdrew licenses of
116 educational programs, branches, affiliates, and colleges only in 2006.
Licenses were recalled, among others, from the Kiev business-college,
educational programs of Kharkov National University of the Ministry of the
Interior in Smila, Poltava, Melitopol, Yevpatoriya, Kerch, Mariupol, Herson, the
educational branch of Kharkov Aeronautical University in Alushta, and a branch
of the East-Ukrainian University in Feodosiya. The Autonomous Republic of
Crimea appears to be a very attractive place for branches and programs of HEIs,
some of which are below the standards, set by the Ministry of Education and
Science.
OPINIONS ON CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION
The country’s prominent politicians, educators, and the media pay more attention
to the problem of corruption in education now than they did before. The
President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko has asked state universities to curtail
the corruption so endemic to admissions processes and called upon rectors and
professors to put a stop to the bribery and cronyism that hold sway during
entrance exams, a widespread practice that he characterized as “shameful and
humiliating.” (MacWilliams, 2005, p. A33) He pointed out corruption in
education in his address to the students of Kiev National University in March 9,
2007 (Vystup, 2006). On June 12, 2007, the Hall of the Academy of Sciences of
Ukraine in Kiev hosted a conference entitled “The Major Corruption Schemes in
the Education System and the Ways to Eradicate Them.” (Osvita, 2007a) These
two events, the Presidential address and the Conference, are illustrative of the
scale of the problem of corruption in higher education and of the level of
attention it receives from the country’s leadership, the public, and the media.
The authorities acknowledge the presence of corruption in education
(Bazhal et al., 2006). However, the official position of all of the rectors is that
there is no corruption in their HEIs and that the highest consideration is given to
knowledge of the applicant. It is assumed that admission to leading HEIs will not
be granted to an applicant whose academic knowledge is not strong enough, even
if he is ready to pay the tuition (Shamrai, 2007).
The fate of the standardized test as a part of the recent educational
reform is of high concern as well. The independent external testing intended to
replace outdated oral entry examinations is considered as an effective tool in
fighting corruption in admissions to publicly funded HEIs (Shamrai, 2007). The
test is designed to provide independent estimates of the high school graduates’
knowledge and the test score should be the major or the only criterion in
admissions decisions in colleges and universities. However, many believe that
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the standardized test will not solve the problem of academic corruption not only
in the educational process, but even in admissions. An Academician of the
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Volodymyr Semynozhenko says that
“Corruption in our country is not a narrow phenomenon confined to a particular
branch or an industry. This is a countrywide problem. Hence, the fight against
corruption should start with the independent testing of state bureaucrats and
politicians.” (Osvita, 2006) This opinion places the issue of corruption in
academia in a broader context, pointing to widespread corruption in many areas
of economic and social life of the society and of a corrupt political structure.
The real intent of the external or independent testing may be in selecting
students with certain characteristics needed for each specialty, and not granting
admissions based simply on the higher scores obtained by the test-takers. Fully
equipped test centers, computerized networks, and specialists are also needed
(Adzhimuratova, 2006). The situation reveals a number of potential problems,
including miscommunications between the Ministries, unclear regulations and
structural frameworks for implementing the reform.
The majority of rectors are against the test. Clear sabotage is anticipated
in the future on the side of some of the rectors in order to compromise the test.
The Minister of Education agrees that the tests will not replace the entry
examinations completely. Some oral examinations will be preserved. This a
priori leaves some space for corruption in college admissions.
ESTIMATES OF CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION
Numerous accusations of corruption as related to higher education, including
admissions and academic process, and, more recently, the standardized test,
necessitate presenting some estimates about corruption’s scale and scope in the
nation’s education industry. The survey conducted by the Institute of Social and
Political Psychology of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in 2006 targeted
students in the leading educational centers of the country, including Kiev,
Kharkov, Donetsk, Lviv, and Odessa. The following responses were obtained to
the question “How in your opinion has the situation with corruption in entering
higher education institutions changed compared to the previous years?”: around
20 percent of the respondents indicate that they know of the cases of bribery, but
the number of such cases has declined; around 27 percent of students said that
bribes were accepted by the faculty members at about the same level, as they
were in previous years and that nothing has changed; 7 to 8 percent think that
bribery is now flourishing. The number of students who admitted paying bribes
for entering the college or university declined from 19 percent in 2005 to 13
percent in 2006 (Bazhal et al., 2006).
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Relatives, friends, and bribe-givers occupy the majority if not all of the
publicly funded places in HEIs. All trends point toward increasing sums of bribes
paid and development of more sophisticated schemes of bribery. The higher the
tuition in the for-tuition program, the higher the “price” of admission to a statefunded place in the same school becomes. The size of every bribe varies
depending upon parents’ wealth, degree of connections with the person, who
arranges the admission, etc. In some of the most elite HEIs even a bribe will not
help to gain admission. In these universities places are thought to be distributed
among the children of politicians, businessmen, and top bureaucrats (Grishina
and Korchinsky, 2006). An attempt to estimate the total potential volume of
corruption in Ukraine’s higher education has yet to be made. Neither surveys nor
mass media reports set any estimates of the overall corruption in higher education
but rather present a mosaic of cases and speculations.
MEASURES TO RESIST CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
The high cost of education and growing demand on higher education from the
population, along with the low salaries of the faculty and staff create a fertile
ground for corruption. An increase in public perceptions of corruption in higher
education facilitates a further increase in corruption as well as in the total amount
of corrupt benefits accumulated by the faculty and staff. Newly designed and
gradually implemented rules and mechanisms of admissions policies and
administering entry examinations may not be working well.
Perceptions about the high level of corruption in bureaucracies and in the
public sector in general, shared by the population, are found to increase actual
corruption (Cabelkova and Hanousek, 2004, Olken, 2006). In the corrupt
environment of higher education in Ukraine, where the level of prosecution is
low and the risk of being prosecuted is low as well, one of the major problems
that corruptors in academia face is an informational vacuum. The problem of
asymmetric information, well described in economic literature, is a big issue in
corrupt agreements and negotiations.
Education corruption has a leading role in creating a culture of
corruption in the society, where one has to make informal payments and gifts in
kindergarten, school, and college. Corruption in academia is acknowledged and
broadly discussed by the media and the public. Such a discussion urges public
officials, responsible for the situation in education, to voice concerns and to
present a set of measures that would adequately respond to growing corruption in
the education industry.
A set of anti-corruption measures includes organizational, economic, and
legal means (Bazhal et al., 2006). Organizational measures include better and
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clearer admissions processes as well as the newly established office within the
Ministry of Education and Science that follows the cases of corruption in
education throughout the country. The Ministry also has its representative in each
of the country’s regions, who, along with the civic committee, responds to the
cases of corruption. The authorities also rely on the emerging civil society,
switching the focus from the investigation of specific cases of corruption to
enhancing legal literacy through educational work among the population and
increasing people’s awareness of the issue. Students are also more involved in
fighting corruption. They are no longer a mere object of educational process but
its participants. The student council works closely with the Ministry. This allows
for a better informational flow from HEIs to the Ministry of Education and
Science.
Among the economic measures the key focus is on the instructors’
salaries. The Minister of Education points out that just 2-3 years ago the
instructor’s monthly salary was equal to 400UAH or $80. He says that “In order
to buy an apartment a professor would have to work for 126 years without eating
and drinking. This created economic ground for corruption that still exists now…
During the last two-and-a-half years the salaries almost doubled. A college
instructor now earns around 1370UAH or $274. This process will continue and
economic ground for corruption will disappear.” (Bazhal, 2006)
The legal measures include an increasing vigilance and awareness among
the law enforcement agencies, rectors, and the public that resulted in around 400
cases of bribery being disclosed, investigated, and prosecuted. The active role of
students and collective action will make involvement in corrupt activities less
attractive and more risky. The Leader of the Peoples-Democratic League of
Youth calls for a law that would delegate more authority to the student union
(Osvita, 2007b).
The Minister of Education emphasizes such technical measures in
fighting corruption, as working closely with rectors and faculty, meeting
regularly with student leaders, conducting anonymous surveys, and undertaking
numerous controlling measures and investigations. At the same time he accuses
students and their parents in perpetuating corruption by presenting excessive
demands for higher grades and admissions, supported by bribes.
The Ministry of Education and Science regularly reminds college faculty
and administrators that they do not have a right to collect fees and fines for
retaking the test or missing classes, as well as the necessity to conduct
examination sessions in a set period. The Ministry also maintains a hot line
during examination sessions, so everyone can call and report suspicious activities
that may take place in HEIs. The Head of the Department of Higher Education in
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the Ministry says that “The ministry does everything to make bribery and
protectionism in higher education impossible.” (Bolyubash, 2006; Shamrai,
2007) He also points to an introduction of “hot lines”, when anyone can call to
the Ministry and report law violations. This, however, may lead to the opposite
reaction. In one of the HEIs the Student Council posted numerous information
posts with the hot line phone number to report possible cases of corruption. As a
result, students took down these posters and called to complain that faculty
members now are afraid of taking bribes and so it is more difficult to pass the
examination session (Shadnaya, 2006). Also, the Education Ministry’s “hot
lines,” for some reason, are only open during the admissions sessions.
Sophistication of corrupt schemes increases along with the development
of different techniques aimed at reducing corruption. Fraud becomes
commonplace in the educational industry and even within the corrupt activities.
For instance, the law requires all the HEIs to provide complete, reliable, and
truthful information about the educational programs offered, as well as license
number and level of accreditation. In practice, however, some HEIs provide
incorrect or incomplete information, fail to maintain the state license or pass the
state accreditation. Trust as a necessary prerequisite of transactions in the
marketplace is abused not only in the market of educational services, but within
the corrupt transactions as well. Grishina and Korchinsky (2006) identify one of
the techniques used by the corrupt educators as a promise of helping an applicant
to gain admission to a state-funded program in exchange for a bribe. The faculty
member who might not be even on the admissions committee or in a position to
influence admissions decisions takes money and then simply waits to see if the
applicant will pass the entry examinations. If the applicant is successful, the
money stays with the faculty member.
Every institution and educational leader may be found lobbying certain
interests. In Seminozhenko’s view “The school tests can simply lead to the
redistribution of corruption flows in education and nothing else. Under the
current circumstance in the country, where an objective law of perpetuation of
corruption works, loopholes will be found any way. Moreover, the level of
knowledge children receive in schools, for which the Ministry of Education and
Science is responsible, is tested by the Center for Educational Quality
Evaluation, which also reports to the Ministry. The first step toward the honest
education evaluation should become creation of a truly independent testing
institution.” (Osvita, 2006)
Demographic problems create pressure on corrupt practices as well.
Some of the schools and numerous kindergartens are being closed for there are
not enough children to educate. In 2006 there were 97 schools closed out of 20
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thousand (Smolyana and Katrichenko, 2006). At the same time the number of
applicants per one state-funded place in such majors as economics, banking, and
finance in the elite HEIs is around 10 people per place and higher. Computer
sciences draw 5 to 7 applicants per place, and even humanities, including cultural
anthropology, history, philosophy, and political science, enjoy large numbers of
applicants (Ksenz, 2006).
CONCLUSION
Ukraine presents all of the forms of corruption in higher education that may be
found throughout the world. The wide spectrum and rich colors of the problem
make the higher education sector in the country of high interest to the
researchers. Ukrainian education is undergoing a major transformation, part of
which is focused on curbing corruption in the academia. The high reputation and
status of Ukrainian educational credentials have to be restored, but the process
has to take place in rapidly changing conditions.
There are a few major changes coming in higher education, including an
introduction and nationwide implementation of the standardized test and the
adjustment of the admissions policies. When the test partially replaces the entry
examinations in colleges and universities, corruption will extend to secondary
education and testing centers, indicating a spillover effect.
The continuous privatization of higher education services will likely
leave less corruption in state-university relations, including embezzlement, fraud,
gross waste, and misallocation of resources, typical for a centralized state-funded
system. At the same time corruption in customer-provider relations may increase.
Provision of false information and fraud may grow. Further decentralization of
the nation’s higher education system, along with growing privatization and an
expected increase in the cost of education will lead to an increase in the total
volume of the market of educational loans. This will broaden the base for
possible corruption in the financial sphere that will regulate the availability of
educational loans and the characteristics of private banks as providers of such
loans.
The declining monopoly of the Ministry of Education and the emerging
multi-centricity in higher education will facilitate increasing the role of nongovernmental organizations, civil society institutions, student unions, and
consortiums of public and private HEIs. Further market reforms may be needed
to build the international reputation of Ukrainian universities and educate
consumers of educational services. The issue of mutual responsibility and
collective reputation becomes an integral part of the concept of intellectual
integrity, when every academic carries a responsibility over the standards of
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education and conduct in the academic community. Modernization of modes of
delivery, curriculum, and instruction, introduction of standardized testing, and
development of university autonomy will help curb corruption in higher
education.
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